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The Shoah within a collective European Memory 
Stefan van der Poel 
 
Historical consensus among Western European countries regarding World War 
II, and the Shoah in particular, has been undermined since 2004 by the eastern 
enlargement of the European Union: in pursuit of a collective European memory, 
the Shoah plays a disruptive role. The idea or conviction of a unifying pan-
European historical narrative is not only premised on the perception that the 
future of Europe would depend on a shared memory, but also that a reckoning 
with a totalitarian past is indispensable for the process of democratisation across 
Europe. In Western Europe there is a growing mistrust that Eastern European 
nations have a sufficiently critical perspective on their nationalist and anti-
Semitic past and traditions. Central and Eastern Europe, meanwhile, fear that 
the dominant role played by the Shoah in Western memory would displace the 
memories of oppression experienced by non-Jews during World War II, while at 
the same time diminishing the enormity of communist crimes (see, for example, 
Struve, 2008: 24).  The Shoah as a potential foundational event of European 
identity thus remains, in various respects, controversial. 
This paper analyses the memory crisis resulting from the conflicting perceptions 
of the Shoah in Western and Central Europe, more specifically in Poland and 
Hungary, the countries that harboured the largest pre-war Jewish communities. 
To clarify this memory crisis, crucial aspects of these divergent perceptions will 
be discussed. In the Western perspective, there is a strong tendency to underline 
the universal meaning and importance of the Shoah and to institutionalise this 
in a number of UN and EU resolutions and declarations (see, for example, Sierp, 
2017; Leggewie, 2009; 2010; Schmid, 2008).  By doing so the Shoah serves as a 
global icon for a global human rights value system and a universally held moral 
standard. From an Eastern perspective this process of globalising Shoah 
discourse is often considered a Western preoccupation and just another 
mechanism with which to further Western cultural domination. In Central 
Europe the supposed singularity of the Shoah is not only often doubted, but the 
focus is far more on processing Communism and on identity-based policies to 
strengthen social cohesion in these times of rapid change and transformation. 
To clarify and illustrate how the Shoah is reflected on in historical debates and 
the public domain, recent Polish and Hungarian monuments, museums, 
literature and films will be discussed. 
Is there a solution for achieving a better mutual understanding? Might the 
Western narrative be indeed too limited, and should it focus more on the general 
totalitarian experience in the East? This might lead to the conclusion that 
Europe’s collective memory turns out to be just as diverse as its diverging 
experiences. In that sense Europe is still far from an all-embracing historical 
narrative about the twentieth century. Or should one remain hopeful and 
consider a common European memory of the Shoah as a permanent and 
evolving process of negotiation and renegotiation of different images and 
narratives of history and victimhood? Are we perhaps just experiencing a 
transitional phase? 
This is not just an academic debate, but even more so a political debate. History, 
identity and the politics of memory are often, especially in Central Europe, 
intertwined. As anti-EU sentiment and populist ideas of national identity are on 
the rise, clashes of memory across the former East-West divide are becoming 
more intense. 
Return to Europe 
In periods of dramatic change many people experience doubt about the 
foundations of their culture or identity. The aftermath of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall was indeed such a period. An ideology was discarded, an economical system 
was dismantled, and basic social conditions were liquidated: the world in which 
people had been living and growing up for forty years had disappeared. This 
naturally jeopardized their self-image, their identity. After forty years of 
communist lies and propaganda, the region was desperately in need of a new 
identity. In this search for a new identity history played a major role. Central 
Europe, as a region, made its reappearance on the map. The name for this region 
underlined both its distance from Eastern Europe and its nearness to Western 
Europe – as perceived by many former Polish, Hungarian and Czech dissidents, 
it hailed a ‘Return to Europe’. Europe’s heart finally seemed in its place again. 
From the outset, Central European states were expected to ‘internalize’ the 
Western set of norms and values, rather than modifying or transforming this set. 
Since the acceptance of Central European countries as member states of the 
European Union in 2004, little has survived of the initial euphoria for the 
European project. The ‘spirit of 1989’ seems to have faded; Brussels is 
increasingly seen as a new danger to Central European identity. As economic and 
legal borders between the nation-states have weakened, cultural ones seem to 
have strengthened. The newly established self-image of Central Europe collides 
with the image of the ‘other’ (Western Europe). Central Europeans tend to think 
that Western Europe has failed to recognize their victimhood. The more than 
two million non-Jewish Poles who were killed during World War II do not seem 
to exist for Western Europe, so the Polish litany goes. Instead, the three million 
Polish Jews are recalled time and time again. For outsiders, Poland has become 
a synonym for death and destruction, for the Shoah. The former concentration 
camp, Auschwitz, has developed into the Polish tourist attraction. This lack of 
Western appreciation and recognition for all that happened in Central Europe, 
especially during and shortly after the Second World War, has caused 
resentment and an unfortunate kind of victimhood rivalry. To many Central and 
Eastern Europeans, history is too often written from a Western-centered 
perspective. They seek recognition for ‘their’ history and resist the hegemonic 
‘core European’ narrative, which does not include their experiences, their 
mentalities and their memories. 
Victimhood: Image and Self-image 
On February 25, 2016, the Polish national TV channel, Telewizja Polska, 
broadcast Pawel Pawlowski’s film Ida (2013), which is set in Poland in 1962. A 
young woman is on the verge of taking her vows to become a Catholic nun. 
Orphaned as an infant during the German occupation of World War II, she must 
now meet her aunt, a former communist state prosecutor. This aunt, who is her 
only surviving relative, reveals that her parents were actually Jewish. From that 
moment onwards, the two women embark on a road trip into the Polish 
countryside to discover the fate of their family. Little is said during the trip and 
even certain historical events (the German occupation of Poland, the Shoah and 
Stalinism) remain unmentioned. In 2015 Ida received the Academy Award in the 
category of ‘Best Foreign Language Film’. The broadcast of this movie on Polish 
television, however, was preceded by an informative disclosure that lasted 
sixteen minutes, mentioning, in detail, the ‘shortcomings’ of Ida: Polish-Jewish 
interrelationships were treated unilaterally and without referring to their 
historical complexity, and the Polish rural population was depicted as primitive, 
anti-Semitic and almost deprived of any human quality. Moreover, the movie did 
not mention the principal German responsibility for wartime suffering. To 
summarise the arguments of the official critics (this needs web reference, see 
footnote below): only the Jewish point of view had been taken into 
consideration, which, apparently, had been the main reason for the bestowal of 
the Academy Award in the first place. 
For the Polish self-image, the ‘correct’ reception of World War II is deemed 
essential, investing the nation with heroism, sacrifice and victimhood. A policy 
on history is developed in order to give the nation a positive image of its own 
past. This positive image is seen as a fundamental precondition for social 
cohesion. The proposed original law, introduced in March 2018 by the Polish 
government and making formulations like ‘Polish destruction camps’ and ‘Polish 
crematories’ punishable, must be seen in this light. For many Poles, the 
association of Poland and the Shoah has the effect of a red rag to a bull. The 
proper formulation should be ‘Nazi camps on Polish territory’ instead of ‘Polish 
camps’. This may be a rather voluminous expression, but it is considered more 
appropriate and does not soil the Polish sense of honour. Former American 
President Barack Obama had to rescind his words when, in a 2012 speech, he 
used the expression ‘Polish death camps’, and subsequently offered an extensive 
apology. 
The draconian measures the Polish government has taken against Jan Tomasz 
Gross match this impression. He has been under attack since 2000 when his book 
Neighbors: the destruction of the Jewish community in Jedwabne, Poland was 
published. Jedwabne, a small city in the northeastern part of Poland, 60 
kilometers west of Bialystok, was the site where, in July 1941, a horrifying 
pogrom took place. Of the approximately 2,700 inhabitants, 1,100 were Jews. All 
these Jewish inhabitants were killed in July 1941 by their non-Jewish neighbors. 
The well-documented book provoked uproar in Poland. Criticism even 
intensified when it became clear that the murders in Jedwabne had not been an 
exception, but one of many comparable pogroms in the same region between 
July and August 1941. With the Soviet army retreating, the German army 
advancing, and government authority collapsing, civilian populations across 
hundreds of villages from the Baltic states to Romania committed atrocities 
against their Jewish neighbors (Kopstein and Wittenberg, 2018: 1).  The Germans 
had not actively participated in these pogroms. ‘Jedwabne’ initiated a far-
reaching and radical debate on the Jewish question in postwar Poland. 
Neighbors outlined a counter-memory to the accepted canon of Shoah, Polish-
Jewish relations and Polish society during World War II. ‘In order to reclaim its 
past’, Gross concludes, ‘Poland will have to tell its past to itself anew’ (2003: 
169). 
An interview with Gross that appeared on 13 September, 2015 in the German 
newspaper Die Welt, added fuel to the fire: the refusal of Central European 
countries to take in Syrian refugees was the cause (Gross, 2015).  Gross pointed 
at the offer of the Polish government to take in a maximum of 2,000 refugees, 
provided they were all Christians. He characterised this attitude of a country with 
forty million inhabitants as ‘heartless’ and ‘shameless’, mentioning Germany as 
a country that took responsibility and showed empathy. During an election 
campaign, Jarosław Kaczynski had warned that Middle Eastern refugees carried 
highly dangerous diseases and parasites. Gross linked this Central European 
attitude to the ‘murderous history’ that, according to Gross, is a feature of this 
region. Then a statement followed for which he is still being strongly criticized in 
Poland. He said that ‘the Poles, rightly so, are proud of their role in the resistance 
against the Nazis, but actually they have killed more Jews than Germans.’  Apart 
from the fact that Gross’ statement is often misquoted out of context – he does 
not state that the Poles killed more Jews than the Germans did– this statement 
hit the Poles right in their hearts. Their self-image was flipped upside down. Poles 
were only partially granted the role of victim; they were also portrayed as 
perpetrators. Reactions were furious within Polish government circles. 
Investigations were started to determine whether Gross’s entry into Poland 
could be restricted, and attempts were made to deprive him of the National 
Medal of Merit he had received in 1996 for his anti-communist position as a 
dissident in 1968. 
The postwar struggle over historical victimhood in Central Europe has a longer 
history. Traditionally, Central European countries have felt underprivileged and 
betrayed by their larger neighbours – namely, Germany and Russia. Central 
European countries always got the short end of the stick when the superpowers 
decided it was time to push boundaries: the twentieth century is illustrative of 
this enduring injustice. From the perspective of Central Europeans, the West is a 
source both of inspiration and dashed hopes. According to George Schöpflin 
(2012: 23), we should accept the concept of ‘incompleteness’ as one of the 
defining features of Central Europe. This region experienced a number of 
externally driven and constructed transformations that interrupted a 
development towards liberal, democratic societies. Moreover these 
transformations caused feelings of insecurity and anxiety among inhabitants, 
feelings that persist to this very day.  According to Schöpflin, the present-day 
democratic experiment in Central and Eastern Europe resembles ‘the imposition 
of Communism: inasmuch as Communism was an attempt to introduce a 
proletarian revolution without a working class, what is now happening is the 
introduction of democracy without democrats’ (1994: 129). 
In particular Poles and Hungarians seem to struggle with their victimhood. They 
often tend to wallow in the role of victim in order to divest themselves of every 
shred of responsibility. Imre Kertész (1929-2016), the Hungarian winner of the 
Nobel Prize for Literature in 2002 and a Holocaust survivor, often criticized this 
phenomenon. He emphasized this lack of collective responsibility when the 
history of his country was being mentioned. If one refuses to live through one’s 
own experiences and to appropriate them, Kertész argued, there is no other 
option than ascribing the past to malicious, foreign, strange powers. According 
to Kertész, ‘Hungary freed itself from Bolshevism, but not from itself’ (2003: 
233). 
Victimhood gets even more complicated when the border between victims and 
perpetrators becomes blurred. There is a growing and disturbing tendency in 
which Communism and Jews are lumped together. In Central Europe the term 
zydokomuna is often used to refer to ‘Jewish Communism’ or a Bolshevik-Jewish 
conspiracy – sometimes the term ‘Judeo-Communism’ is used as well. Similar to 
the attitude of prewar nationalist circles, Jews are being identified as 
communists, destabilizing the country with their revolutionary ideas and 
bringing overall misfortune. Because Jews brought Communism to the region, it 
is suggested that they forfeited the right to be considered victims. These 
unfounded accusations often served to justify all kinds of anti-Jewish measures 
and even outright pogroms, like the one in Jedwabne. The wartime suffering of 
the Jews is matched, according to many Central Europeans, by the pain the Jews 
supposedly inflicted upon the Christian world during the communist era. 
Shoah in Western memory culture 
Since the 1970s, the importance of the Shoah in Western memory culture has 
increased constantly. In the first two postwar decades the emphasis in this 
memory culture regarding World War II was placed predominantly on heroism, 
resistance and the evil that had been conquered by united societal forces – a 
discourse that was both national and Christian. In the 1960s this image began to 
tilt. The central position of the Shoah in the memory culture of both the United 
States and Western Europe, might, in accordance with the American sociologist 
of religion Robert Bellah, nowadays be termed a ‘civil religion’. The memory of 
the Shoah is kept alive in a ritual and emotional way. Special days have been 
reserved for this purpose, and historically meaningful locations have become 
true lieux de mémoire. In this way the Shoah has been turned into a kind of 
religion with its own specific mythos, rituals, saints, and religious doctrine (see 
also Oegema, 2003).  In the Western world the memory of the Shoah reached its 
apogee in the 1990s, at the same time the Cold War era abruptly came to an end. 
Eva Hoffman writes in After such knowledge: a meditation on the aftermath of 
the Holocaust: ‘Memory stepped in at the very moment when the old 
geopolitical arrangements defining our world gave way, and no new “meta-
narrative”, no new frameworks for perceiving the world, had yet emerged’ 
(2005: 242). 
According to Ivan Krastev, the European Union has always been ‘an idea in 
search of a reality’ (2017: 5). Krastev argues that what once kept the union 
together no longer holds. Shared memories of World War II have faded from 
view (see, for example, Judt, 2005; Pakier and Stråth (eds), 2012; Leggiewie, 
2010).  Since the Berlin Wall fell, many historians have attempted to write a 
common European history based on shared totalitarian experiences of the 
twentieth century with the Shoah occupying a central role.  The Cold War had 
created a sense of community and common interests between the Western 
European countries, acting as the great neutralizer of nationalism and the 
particular memories bound up with it (Diner, 2003).  According to Lars Rensmann 
and Julius Schoeps these countries had to ‘accept a substantial break with the 
past. Europe’s post-national integration in the European Union evolved (..) as a 
moral and political counter-model to the anti-Semitic, totalitarian and ethnic-
nationalist legacy that shaped the first half of the European twentieth century’ 
(2011: 3).  The end of the Cold War, however, revealed the fragility of this sense 
of community among the EU member states, and contributed, at first, to a 
politics of renationalization. 
In 2001, Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider (2001: 214) espoused the thesis that 
the memory of the Shoah had turned into a ‘new foundational element’ after 
the Cold War and that it could constitute the center of an emergent common 
European memory.  The predominance of the Shoah acquired the position of the 
‘ultimate evil’, a position that was not challenged until the Eastern enlargement 
in 2004 when memory clashes intensified. In the Epilogue of Postwar, titled: 
From the house of the dead: an essay on modern European memory, Tony Judt 
concludes that ‘those who would become full Europeans in the dawn of the 
twenty-first century must first assume a new and far more oppressive heritage. 
Today the pertinent European reference is not baptism. It is extermination. 
Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket’ (2005: 803).  
Claus Leggewie (2009; 2010) too, in his articles ‘Seven circles of European 
memory’ and ‘Battlefield Europe’, is in search for a pan-European narrative that 
includes both East and West in a common European story. A pan-European 
historical awareness is necessary to cope with common political problems. 
Leggewie also warns that anyone who wishes to give European society a unified 
political identity will have to rate the discussion and recognition of disputed 
memories just as highly as treaties, a common currency and open borders. In his 
narrative the Shoah plays an important role as ‘a negative founding myth’.  In a 
way, the Holocaust has been transposed into a sort of pan-memory, a Western 
(if not global) heritage in which countries acknowledge the Shoah as part of their 
national history. 
The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, which was held between 
January 26 and 28, 2000, seemed to underline and institutionalise this growing 
global importance of the Shoah. Representatives from 46 governments around 
the world met in Stockholm to discuss Holocaust education, remembrance and 
research. At the end of this meeting, all attendees, including Poland and 
Hungary, signed a declaration committing themselves to the preservation of the 
memory of those who were murdered during the Shoah. This declaration states 
that January 27th – the day on which Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated in 1945 
– will be recognized as Holocaust Memorial Day. Twelve European countries, 
including Germany, chose 27 January as their Holocaust Memorial Day, and 
eleven countries chose to adopt a different day linked to their own history. The 
first three points of the Declaration state that the Shoah fundamentally 
challenged the foundations of our civilization and that its unprecedented 
character will always hold universal meaning. The Shoah left an indelible scar 
across Europe and its magnitude, so the declaration continues, should be seared 
forever in our collective memory. With humanity scarred by genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, racism, antisemitism and xenophobia, the international community 
shares a solemn responsibility to fight against those evils.  The Task Force for 
International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research 
was institutionalized after the Stockholm Conference. The goal of this Task Force 
is a further normative European adjustment of the memory of the Shoah 
(Schmid, 2008: 189-190). 
On November 1, 2005, sixty years after the end of the Second World War, the 
United Nations declared January 27th the ‘International Day of Commemoration 
in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust’. A few weeks later, on March 16th, 
the European Parliament passed a similar resolution by which the Holocaust 
Memorial Day on January 27th became the first (official) European 
commemoration of the third millennium. An official policy on the history of the 
Shoah was indeed evolving. The Shoah became a global icon and a symbol for 
radical evil. It formed the starting point for a global human rights value system 
and posed an obligation to maintain a universally-held moral standard. These 
implications can be brought together in the line ‘Never again Auschwitz!’ 
 
Shoah in Eastern memory culture 
In Central Europe, under the influence of Communism, this process developed in 
a completely different way. After 1945 there was neither room, nor the 
perceived need, to reflect extensively upon the Jewish fate. There had been 
almost no public discussion of the Shoah. This postwar silence that fell across 
Central Europe remained unchanged for almost forty years. Communism left a 
vacuum into which nationalism, nostalgia, xenophobia and ancient quarrels 
flowed. The Shoah simply did not fit in the communist ideology, in which only 
fascists and anti-fascists existed. Anti-fascism enabled many countries to project 
all responsibility for war crimes onto Nazi Germany and served as a legitimising 
ideology and founding myth for the seizure of power in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Communists tended to downplay Jewish suffering in favour of working-
class anti-fascism. Furthermore, the subject was not opportune for communists 
hoping to widen their small base of power in these countries. In 1973 Imre 
Kertész’s novel Fateless was rejected by a Hungarian publishing house because 
it failed to conform to the prescribed opposition between National Socialism and 
Soviet Communism. Fateless did not fit with the doctrine of Communism as a 
new beginning after a historical conflagration (Cooper, 2011: 7; 11).  Ironically, 
in 2002 it was precisely because of the content of this novel that Kertész received 
the Nobel Prize for Literature. 
After the end of the Cold War the tendency to downplay Jewish suffering did not 
change overnight. In Central Europe, the Western preoccupation with the Shoah 
often goes uncomprehended and therefore a shared cultural memory still seems 
a long way off. The level of exclusive attention devoted to the Shoah in the West 
is considered to be historically unwarranted from the Central European 
perspective. At the same time, attention to the Shoah seems to function as a 
moral yardstick for new EU member states. Unlike Western Europe, in Central 
Europe the focus continues to be on working through the trauma produced 
during Communism. Victims of communist oppression feel like they haven’t 
been granted their rightful place in Europe’s historical memory and moral 
consciousness. 
To the West, the end of World War II meant freedom; for the other half of Europe 
it brought new forms of occupation, subjugation, and terror. In the countries 
behind the Iron Curtain a new form of totalitarianism was in the making, with 
one totalitarian experience following another. In this sense the totalitarian 
experience in Central Europe is far more complicated, layered, and bloodier than 
its Western European counterpart. In Central Europe, one frequently compares 
the experiences under Communism to those under Nazism. This comparison 
between Nazi and communist crimes, however, is rather controversial in the 
West because it counters the allegedly abhorrent uniqueness of Nazi crimes and 
the singularity of the Shoah in particular. In this part of the world Nazism is 
regarded as the absolute evil and is therefore incomparable per se. Communism, 
as objectionable as it may be, cannot be blamed for the systematic murder of a 
group of people based on supposed racial differences. 
Terror House (Terror Háza in Hungarian) is a good example of the tendency to 
compare victimhoods. This museum, situated at 60 Ándrassy Boulevard in 
Budapest, offers a narrative of twentieth-century history in terms of 
totalitarianism, and is located in the former headquarters of the Hungarian 
Fascists (the Arrow-Cross Movement). After 1945 the building became the 
headquarters of the ÁVO, the communist Hungarian secret police. Financed and 
initiated in 2002 by the Fidesz government, the museum presents a rather one-
sided view of the totalitarian experiences of the Hungarians in the twentieth 
century. Even before entering the building, visitors are confronted with two huge 
symbols: a red star and a black arrow cross. Both Nazism and Communism are 
presented as foreign-grown movements that were brought to Hungary by force. 
The museum leads its visitors on a chronological journey through fifty years of 
Hungarian history and documents both totalitarian regimes that ruled the 
country in the last century. Yet, the exhibition devotes far more attention to the 
communist era than to any events that preceded it. Only the first two rooms out 
of twenty deal with the wartime years, and the Shoah is treated as a marginal 
phenomenon. The overwhelming and interactive exhibition devotes vastly more 
emphasis – and space – to the crimes of Communism than to the annihilation of 
Hungary’s Jews. This emphasis suggests that the communist era was far more 
significant and influential. Randolph L. Braham, an expert on the history of the 
Shoah in Hungary and the author of Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in 
Hungary (1985) , strongly criticized the museum: ‘it serves, above all, as a 
formidable instrument in the hands of nationalists bent on vindicating and 
rehabilitating the Horthy’s era and making it once more a past usable by 
politicians in the present’ (2004: 14).  According to Braham, successive post-
communist Hungarian governments have consistently pursued policies that have 
been aimed at rehabilitating the interwar Horthy regime and revitalizing the 
national, Christian principles that guided it. Moreover, these policies try to 
absolve Hungary of any guilt for the Shoah by placing ultimate responsibility on 
the Germans and focusing on the ‘positive’ experiences of the Jews since their 
emancipation in 1867 and on the heroic activities of Christian Hungarian rescuers 
during the German occupation (Braham, 2016: 263). 
In Hungary the politics of remembering the Shoah have been characterized more 
by conflict than by consensus. In the memorial year (2014), a statue was erected 
on Szabadság Tér (Liberty Square) in Budapest named the ‘Memorial of the 
Victims of the German Occupation’. It depicts the crushing of the archangel 
Gabriel, symbolizing Hungary, by Germany’s imperial eagle. The Hungarian 
nation as a collective is portrayed as a victim of Nazi predation (or rather 
‘German’ predation, as no Nazi-symbol is shown). Critics of the monument argue 
that it distorts Hungary’s role in the Shoah by exclusively blaming the Germans 
and, in doing so, evading responsibility for and suppressing the active role of 
Hungarians in sending more than 400,000 Jews to the death camps in 1944.  
Alarmed by these developments, Braham announced on 26 January 2014, in an 
open letter, his decision to return the Medium Cross of the Order of Merit of the 
Republic of Hungary, which he had received in October 2011. He regarded the 
memorial as ‘a cowardly attempt to detract attention from the Horthy regime’s 
involvement in the destruction of the Jews and to homogenize the Holocaust 
with the “suffering” of the Hungarians under German occupation,’ an occupation 
that was, according to Braham, ‘not only unopposed but generally applauded’ 
(The Guardian, 2014).  James Kirchick, in his book The End of Europe: Dictators, 
Demagogues, and the Coming Dark Age, points at the fact that this monument 
in many ways resembles the work of socialist realism: ‘Indeed, it’s striking how a 
monument built by a government that claims for itself the exclusive legacy of 
Hungarian anti-communist resistance so much resembles a work of socialist 
realism. By obscuring Jewish victimhood entirely and ascribing total innocence 
to Hungarians and total evil to Germans, the memorial is as factually deceptive 
and politically exploitative as any Stalinist icon’ (2017: 43). 
In 2013, the Polin Museum, in the heart of the former Jewish ghetto of Warsaw, 
was founded. This museum encompasses a thousand years of Polish-Jewish 
history and offers a versatile and nuanced overview of a community with all its 
highs and lows. The Shoah is indeed an important feature in this exhibition 
(though according to some Western critics not important enough, with 15% of 
the exhibition is devoted to the Shoah) but the terms ‘Poland’ and ‘antisemitism’ 
do not coincide in the museum’s exhibition. Michael Steinlauf (2008: 318), a 
senior historical consultant at the Polin Museum, states that the focus of the 
museum is on centuries of ordinary Jewish life rather than on the intervals of 
catastrophe.  Poland was for many centuries very attractive to Jews, who 
enjoyed more freedom there than in surrounding countries. Polin’s depiction of 
the Polish Jewish experience is therefore ambiguous and leaves room for 
questions. The museum helps Poles to embark on a reconfiguration of their 
identity as something rather more diverse than homogenous and is thereby 
more suited to the complexities of twenty-first century Europe (Steinlauf, 2008: 
321). 
The Holocaust Memorial Center in Budapest was opened in 2004, sixty years 
after German troops occupied the country. This museum, even more so than 
Polin, serves as a kind of ‘counter museum’ for the aforementioned Terror House 
exhibition. The museum presents the Shoah, according to Paul Hanebrink, ‘as an 
example of the slippery slope down which a society can tumble when it begins 
to deny basic rights to groups of its citizens’ (2013: 282).  The dominant motif of 
the exhibition is the relationship between the state and its citizens. The title of 
the permanent exhibition reads: ‘From Deprivation of Rights to Genocide’. The 
occupation by the Germans brought a fatal acceleration of trends that had 
already started during the interwar period when, from 1920 onwards, anti-
Jewish laws were introduced in Hungary. The exhibition aims at the preparation 
of young people for life in a democratic, multicultural, multilingual and more 
interconnected Europe (Hanebrink, 2013: 283).  The Holocaust Memorial Center 
has often been criticized by the Fidesz government for the way it depicts the 
Shoah in Hungary in general, and the role of the Horthy government in particular. 
In 2013 the announcement of the opening of a new Holocaust museum at the 
Józsefváros railway station in Budapest came as a surprise to many. The museum 
was curated as a memorial to child victims of the Holocaust. Mária Schmidt, a 
longtime advisor to Victor Orbán, who also is in charge of the Terror House, was 
designated as its general director. She declared that the site would only focus on 
the deportations and not on the events preceding them (Kovács and Mindler-
Steiner, 2015: 61).  The museum is seen by many as an ‘alternative’ to the 
Holocaust Memorial Center – a ‘counter-counter museum’, so to speak. The 
name – House of Fates (Sorsok Háza) – is probably chosen to counteract the 
impact of the Nobel laureate Imre Kertész with his autobiographical novel 
Fateless (Sorstalanság). György Konrád, the Hungarian novelist who, as a child, 
survived the Shoah in Budapest, was asked to join the advisory board of the 
museum. In an open letter he rejected this: ‘I find it difficult to free myself of the 
suspicion that this hurried organization of an exhibit is not so much about the 
100,000 murdered Jewish children but rather about the current government’ 
(Kovács and Mindler-Steiner, 2015: 60).  The museum was supposed to be 
opened in April 2015 but so far the opening has not yet taken place. 
Dreaming of Europe: the broken home 
In Dreaming of Europe, Michael Zeeman (1958-2009), a Dutch writer and 
journalist, uses the metaphor of a broken home in an essay (Zeeman, 2004).  
After four decades of isolation, between 1945-1989, relatives have finally been 
reunited around the family table. Their conversation falters and the atmosphere 
is uncomfortable; the family members do not seem to have much in common 
anymore. The past decades have left their marks: experiences and memories 
differ. In short, it turns out that the family members have grown apart. It is not 
like awakening from a nightmare, feeling relieved that it is over while simply 
continuing your daily lives as the Western family members seem to think. ‘We 
are family, and we show each other the proper respect, but when it comes right 
down to it we are not entirely certain that we are in agreement about the family 
history. Perhaps we need to take a good look at who actually appears in these 
old photographs of ours’ (Zeeman, 2004: 47).  Our confidence in the West turns 
out to be as naive as their distrust is legitimate. ‘Yet difficult as a new world 
without borders may be, that which lies beneath, that world of experience and 
judgement, is more difficult by far’ (Zeeman, 2004: 48). 
In recent years the refugee crisis in Europe has shown that Central Europe does 
not share the very cosmopolitan values on which the European Union is founded. 
While many in the West tend to regard these cosmopolitan values as the core of 
their European identity, Central Europeans do not regard the return to a 
multicultural society as a very inviting prospect. In a way, the former East-West 
divide within Europe seems to have revived. This results in a division between a 
more globalist approach, coherent with an open society, versus a more nativist 
approach that suits a closed society. This chasm can be observed nowadays in 
many European countries. What we are experiencing in Europe today, according 
to Krastev (2018: 43), is not so much a ‘lack of solidarity’ but a ‘clash of 
solidarities’.  National, ethnic, and religious solidarities are colliding with post-
national, cosmopolitan solidarities on which the commemoration of the Shoah 
is also based. According to the Stockholm Declaration of 2000, the Shoah should 
be the starting point for a coherent system of values regarding human rights and 
a universally-held moral standard. And although most European governments 
signed the declaration, formally agreed the UN and EU resolutions and 
inaugurated an ‘International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims 
of the Holocaust’, the true intentions of some of these countries might be 
doubted. In Central Europe two parallel official sets of memory exist side by side: 
one for internal use and one as a more symbolic gesture to the often critical 
outside world. The polarization of Holocaust remembrance between the EU 
member states in the West and those in Central and Eastern Europe seems to be 
growing. 
A way out of the memory crisis? 
The assertion that the future of Europe depends on a common memory of the 
twentieth century and that the processing of a totalitarian past is essential for 
democratization, seems by no means a commonplace. It raises the question of 
whether there might be a possible approach between the two conflicting 
perceptions of the Shoah and its place within a more general or even global 
setting. Are there developments pointing in the direction of a rapprochement 
between Western and Central Europe in this memory crisis? Not when one 
considers the illiberal turns taken by the dominant political parties in Poland 
(with PiS) and Hungary (with Fidesz). The nationalist-populist governments in 
power broaden the gap with their identity-based policies. At an academic level 
however, changes are indeed taking place. One might consider Timothy Snyder’s 
Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (2010) and Black Earth: the 
Holocaust as History and Warning (2015) as an attempt to overcome major 
differences within memory culture.  Snyder tries to establish an approach to 
history where both totalitarian experiences are united. In the debate on the 
Shoah, he distinguishes so-called civilizers (the Europe of the Enlightenment in 
the West) and nationalizers (the Europe of Eastern experience). He criticizes the 
one-sided way in which the Shoah is regarded in Western Europe and is also 
critical of the recent dominance of its memory culture, arguing that: 
‘Commemoration is the siren song of signification, appealing to emotions but 
fatal for thought’ (Snyder, 2013).  That which is most effectively commemorated 
becomes that which is most felicitously narrated. This results, according to 
Snyder, in a representation of the Shoah that is often reduced to a reflection of 
contemporary emotions. Snyder calls this confusion between present resonance 
and past power ‘commemorative causality’. According to him we should pay 
more attention to the fate of the Ostjuden (Jews who lived traditional Jewish 
lives in Central and Eastern Europe and who spoke mainly Yiddish). These 
Ostjuden formed the overwhelming majority of the victims of the Shoah and 
were mainly killed by bullets instead of gas chambers. According to Snyder the 
lack of interest in the regional circumstances of the lands where Jews lived and 
died is symptomatic of this commemorative causality.  Historians often tend to 
ignore the historical setting of the Shoah and focus too much on antisemitism as 
its main explanation. The result is an incomplete (Western) public understanding 
of the Shoah. The Western ‘civilizers’ tend to emphasize the singularity of the 
Shoah and the ‘wrong turn’ taken by German/Western civilization; the Eastern 
‘nationalizers’ on the other hand emphasize Stalinist crimes towards their 
national states. Snyder (2013: 8) states that ‘the cost of using east European anti-
Semitism as the narrative glue that holds together shaky explanations of the 
Holocaust is the maintenance of the familiar civilizational gradient between 
West and East.’ 
Snyder also criticizes the way the image of evil in the West has been narrowed 
down to Auschwitz (the concentration and extermination camp). In the words of 
Snyder (2009): ‘Auschwitz, generally taken to be an adequate or even a final 
symbol of the evil of mass killing, is in fact only the beginning of knowledge, a 
hint of the true reckoning with the past still to come.’  Auschwitz became the 
symbol of the Second World War in the West. But is Auschwitz indeed 
representative of the Shoah? In his article ‘Holocaust: The ignored reality’, 
Snyder (2009) sums up a number of arguments why it is not.  He even states that 
the narrative has an unmistakable Western flavour. In Auschwitz, the vast 
majority of victims came from Western Europe while most victims of the Shoah 
were actually Ostjuden. The Jews from Poland and the Soviet Union constituted 
the overwhelming majority of Jews who were killed; three million Jews 
originated from Polish and Soviet territory. A majority of the Ostjuden were not 
killed at Auschwitz but executed on the spot – the so called ‘Shoah by bullets’. 
Those who were deported mostly ended up in Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor, 
Majdanek, and Chelmno. These were, unlike Auschwitz, exclusively 
extermination camps, where hardly anyone survived. Before Auschwitz even 
started operating in late 1942, the majority of Holocaust victims had already 
been killed. Those who did survive the Shoah were able to record their stories 
only in the West, as the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe were 
disinclined to pay much attention to commemorating Jews as a specific group. 
Stalinism prevented us from seeing Hitler’s mass killings in proper perspective, 
as Snyder argues (2009). 
In their article ‘On agonistic memory,’ Anna Cento Bull and Hans Lange Hansen 
also try to find a way out of two conflicting modes of remembering the Shoah; 
negotiating between what they call the cosmopolitan mode of remembering on 
the one hand, and the post-nationalist mode on the other. They recognize the 
importance of transnational influence on local memory discourse and welcome 
at the same time the creation of collective feelings of solidarity. They have come 
up with the term ‘agonistic memory’, which is both reflexive and dialogic. 
Agonism refers to the need to recognize emotions and passions as an integral 
part of political confrontation – think of the ‘broken home’ of Zeeman – that in 
the end might lead to a more ‘dialogic memory’.  One should try to break through 
the walls of separate suffering. In this sense, Konrad Jarausch requires the 
recognition of the ‘other’ as equally afflicted. 
Another alternative might be to link the various national memories with human 
rights and an awareness of racism and xenophobia. This seems to be an approach 
that is shared by Claus Leggewie. As one cannot prescribe the content of a 
European collective memory, ‘forms of respectful confrontation’ probably can 
be stimulated, as Leggewie (needs date) argues. The ‘European way’ might be to 
voice dissent and discuss historical debates openly.  In doing so one might 
improve the functioning of contemporary European democracy. Eva Hoffman 
(2005: 277) states that ‘sympathy for those who suffered is our moral duty; but 
we cannot cease to treat the victim as a moral being. […] We need the kind of 
tolerance that does not dissolve either others’ or our own integrity or 
legitimacy.’ 
Collective memories should be based on the recognition that memories are 
indeed plural and never static. To reclaim their own pasts, people will have to 
recount their pasts anew, live through their own experiences and appropriate 
them. This is exactly what Ida does when she embarks on a road trip with her 
unknown aunt into a troublesome past. Europe should not only reinterpret its 
past but also try to re-imagine its future. 
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